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From Rigging to Violence
Mapping of political regression
Bernard Calas
1 Mapping of the elections and the post-election violence which took place in Kenya at the
beginning of 2008 allows certain parties to initially qualify it through an analysis that
combines both ethnicity and violence. The ethnicising of violence does not seem to be
clear while the localization of violence in the country is more often a result of land issues
rather than direct ethnic antagonism. In contrast, crime in urban areas has taken on the
form of unequivocal ethnicisation.
2 On 27 December 2007, the 14 million Kenyans registered on the voters’ roll were called
upon to vote three times, casting three different ballot papers in three separate ballot
boxes to elect their President, one of their 210 MPs and their local councillor.1 The main
presidential candidates were the incumbent Mwai Kibaki, opposition leader Raila Odinga
—son of the father of opposition, Oginga Odinga—and their challenger Kalonzo Musyoka.
The importance of ethnic identification in electoral allegiance and choice as well as in the
Western view of African politics makes a compelling case to state from the offset that the
first candidate is a Kikuyu from Central Province, the second a Luo from Nyanza Province
and the third one is a Kamba from the south of Eastern Province.
3 The main stake  in  this  election was  whether  voters  would  re-elect  Kibaki,  who had
brought  great  hope  to  the  2002  elections.  During  his  term  in  office,  there  was
disillusionment  over  his  aspiration  to  new  politics,  improve  social  and  economic
conditions  of  the  majority  and  inject  morals  into  political  life,  especially  due  to  a
maintained  high  level  of  corruption  and  worsening  inequalities  as  the  country
experienced  rapid  economic  growth.  As  early  as  during  the  2005  constitutional
referendum,  which  the  opposition-backed  “No”  campaign  won,  voters  had  opted  to
punish  the  disappointing  government  personified  by  an  ageing  and  a  stuttering
president.2 The  second stake  in  these  elections  was  whether  parliamentary  elections
would determine the presidential choice, giving the President a parliamentary majority.
Three parties, or rather three nebulous supporters were in the race: Orange Democratic
Movement  (ODM)  behind Raila  Odinga,  Party  for  National  Unity  (PNU)  behind Mwai
Kibaki and ODM-Kenya (ODM-K) behind Musyoka.
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4 The three phases of the Kenyan crisis—voting, violence and socio-spatial adjustments—
constitute an event which refutes the idea that Kenya since the 2002 elections, Kenya had
opened up a new chapter of “democrazy” (characterized by failed elections, sealed with
political and ethnic violence and political manipulation of the second period of the Moi
era) to become an “emerging democracy.” Furthermore, one may wonder whether the
January-February  2008  “events”  were  a  political  split  with  lasting  consequences  or
whether they are as old as Kenyan politics, periodically rocked by violent fluctuations. An
attempt to answer this question amounts to interpreting the meaning of the events with
regard  to  the  past  and  in  the  light  of socio-spatial  developments  which  it  entails.
Secondly,  a  parallel  will  be  drawn  to  electoral  mapping  and  violence  mapping  that
followed the elections, in order to attempt to establish spatial figures, which, although
being temporary and partial, is indispensable.
 
Sketch mapping of the electorate
5 Generally speaking, voter turnout was 70% and there was no significant difference in the
turnout for the three elections, although the turnout for the presidential election was
slightly higher, either due to rigging or due to higher stakes. The highest turnout (high
figures between 85% and 95%, which undoubtedly indicated rigging) was registered along
the shores of Lake Victoria—in Luoland, and in the western parts of Central Province, in
Kikuyu land. The lowest turnout was registered in the largest urban centres, Nairobi,
Mombasa and Nakuru.  Most of  the other constituencies registered low voter turnout
between 60% and 70%. An analysis of the meaning of the turnout is rendered difficult by
rigging and the difficulty in pinning this down. The election rigging, which was massive,
was however, neither systematic nor unilateral and it cannot be said for sure that this
altered the final  result  of  the presidential  election apart  from further delegitimizing
government,  politics  and the regime in the eyes  of  Kenyans.  The frauds particularly
wanted to influence the result of the presidential poll whose stakes were a determining
factor on the entire general election.
6 Four  main  types  of  irregularities  can  be  identified.  The  first  three  occurred  mainly
outside Nairobi and influenced the results at the local level while the fourth one took
place in Nairobi at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre (KICC) tallying centre.
This latter influenced the national outcome of the presidential poll.  The first type of
irregularity took place during the voter registration exercise; as a result, there were up to
15% dead voters registered in the roll.3 The second type of electoral fraud took place in
ethnically  homogenous  constituencies.  Inflated  results  brought  the  voter  turnout  to
figures higher than 100%.4 In constituencies with low levels of literacy, on the fringes of
“arable Kenya” (Coast and North-Eastern provinces, Maasailand, North Rift), there were
suspicions of ODM poll agents being compromised by government agents and massive
vote-buying was reported.5 Finally, some results were altered, sometimes clumsily, during
transportation  between  local  polling  stations  and  the  national  tallying  centre  and
collation of results at KICC.6 These irregularities had the heaviest impact on the final
result of the presidential poll. By 30 December 2007, ODM and PNU observers at KICC
unanimously agreed that the irregularities affected 44 constituencies. The irregularities
occurred mostly in the country’s most populous districts as the map in the annex shows.
There is a possibility that all the irregularities influenced 3% per cent of the vote while
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the  margin separating Kibaki  and Odinga,  giving victory  to  the  former,  was  at  least
232,000 votes, an equivalent of 2.3% of the votes cast.
7 Since  the  electoral  fraud  influenced  the  presidential  poll  result,  the  parliamentary
elections seemed to be a better reflection of public opinion. A total of 207 MPs were
named (elections in three constituencies having been cancelled) and on 15 January during
the election of the National Assembly Speaker, 105 MPs carried the day after three rounds
of voting in favour of the ODM candidate,  Kenneth Marende. Beyond this short-lived
victory  for  ODM,  the  elections  appeared  to  totally  overhaul  the  political  class  and
dismissed more than half of the incumbent MPs. To an extent, one could say there was a
real  generational  transition  and  new  political  landscape  in  Kenya.  Younger  people,
newcomers and women emerged at the expense of a long list of old hands in politics (such
as  Nicholas  Biwott  and  Simeon  Nyachae)  and  descendants  of  prestigious  political
dynasties (including the three sons of former President Moi, who all lost). However, some
of the newly elected were not political novices since them were in fact losers in the 2002
elections. Therefore, even though the impression of overhaul was real, it remained to be
qualified. This development took place in all regions and it was as true to ODM as to PNU.
Thus in north Rift, the protest vote wave swept in 12 new faces in 19 constituencies (N.
Biwott,  former  third  in  command  and  Minister  for  energy  in  the  Moi  regime,  was
defeated by a 38 year-old).  In Central  Province,  ministers who enjoyed support from
leading figures like Lucy Kibaki (the president’s wife), including John Michuki, also lost.
This also affected opposition barons in Luoland, along the coast and in Kisiiland.
8 The partisan allegiance of the elected leaders seemed to be along real regional bastions
and pointed to an ethnic poll.  Indeed,  the map of  the parliamentary election results
showed contours of three consistent and relatively ethno-politically homogenous spaces:
western (virtually Luo) ODM, central (virtually Kikuyu) PNU and allies, as well as central-
eastern (virtually Kamba)  ODM-K.  For their  part,  Nairobi  and Mombasa cities  largely
voted ODM.
9 However, talking about ethnic votes is both accurate and somewhat simplistic. Beyond
the  presidential  electoral  fraud,  Kibaki  harvested  nearly  50% of  the  votes  while  the
Kikuyu (7 million) are only 22% of the population. This means that more than half of his
electors  were  not  Kikuyu.  Their  neighbours  in  Mount  Kenya,  the  Embu  and  Meru
(2 million or 5% of the Kenyan population) are allies of the Kikuyu. Generally, it can be
said that despite the Kikuyu voting overwhelmingly for Kibaki, all those who voted for
Kibaki were not Kikuyu. A similar logic applies to Odinga. The Luo are only 13% of the
Kenyan population yet Odinga garnered almost 50% of the vote. Although the Luo voted
overwhelmingly for ODM, not all those who voted ODM were Luo.
10 The analysis according to coherent and solid political blocs could also prove to be an
illusion. Indeed, the ODM, and to a larger extent, the presidential coalition around PNU
and even ODM-K, were fragile and volatile outfits.  The nomination and primary polls
episode  was  significant  in  this  matter.  In  October-November  2007,  the  parties  held
primaries to nominate their parliamentary candidates. Apart from some targeted
incidents of violence, particularly against candidates, these primaries gave rise to a real
musical chain of party allegiance. Some politicians changed parties several times because
they had been denied nomination. This was proof of how unreliable party membership
was and one could switch very quickly depending on the circumstances. The idea that the
opposition could rely on its parliamentary majority to impede the president’s initiative
appeared even more  unrealistic  because  ten of  the  newly-elected MPs  from western
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Kenya belonged to NARC (National Rainbow Coalition - Kenya), President Kibaki’s party
until  PNU was formed and they would obviously be under intense pressure from the
presidential camp to “cross the floor.”7 The about-turn of the second runner-up in the
presidential  poll,  K.  Musyoka,  who suddenly  swore  allegiance  to  the  government  by
accepting  the  vice-president’s  post  in  January,  only  confirmed  this  view  of  Kenyan
politics, for the least “pragmatic.” The revolt by ODM-K officials during the nomination of
MPs  (10  MPs  are  nominated  by  the  president  just  before  the  opening  of  the  first
parliamentary session after they are proposed by party leaders and according to the
party’s strength in parliament) confirmed this serious instability within political parties.
They  are  vulnerable  to  break-ups  at  the  slightest  excuse  or  pressure  (corruption,
threats…).
11 In reality, the spatial distribution of votes emphasizes the combination of several factors
which contributed to the ODM wave and the resistance to a consequent bloc brought
about by the alliance between PNU and ODM-K.
12 The identity vote inevitably played out in Luo, Kikuyu and Kamba land. Indeed, each of
the three main political leaders in the election, Kibaki, Odinga and Musyoka—as well as
their  parties—PNU  and  its  affiliate  parties,  ODM and  ODM-K,  won  in  the  respective
regions.  The  consistency  between  the  presidential  poll,  party  allegiance,  high  voter
turnout,  constituency  contours  and  ethnic  identity  make  it  possible  to  talk  about
electoral strongholds and even political territories.
13 In  the  Western  Province,  Luhyaland  and  in  Meru  and  Embu,  Eastern  Province,  it  is
evident from the voting patterns that the process was more regional than identity-linked.
In fact, what led the Luhya to vote for Odinga and ODM while the Embu and Meru voted
for Kibaki and the PNU was the feeling of a community socio-spatial exclusion concerning
the Luos,  and on the other,  the convergence of  interests and history concerning the
Kikuyu. The feeling is certainly partly underpinned by the spatial unity between the two
sides.
14 The protest and generational vote, which was higher in urban centre played out in favour
of  the  Orange  Party.  The  support  of  a  large  number  of  Nairobi  youth—especially  in
Nairobi Eastlands slums like Embakasi, which is largely but not exclusively inhabited by
the Kikuyu—explains ODM’s success in six out of the capital’s eight constituencies. The
same line of reasoning explains the extent of Orange victory in Mombasa.
15 Ulterior motives over land played out elsewhere, especially in the Rift Valley. Here, the
desire to prevent the president, who was perceived as the potential bearer of a threat
over land, from remaining in office, was one of the main reasons the Kalenjin people
voted ODM. This over-determination of the vote by old land stakes explains the failure of
the marriage of convenience between Moi and Kibaki.8 Indeed, this alliance was based on
the idea that Moi’s support to Kibaki would be enough to placate Kalenjins over Kibaki’s
ethnic origin. Kalenjins are the majority in west and north Rift and consider the Kikuyu,
led by the(ir) President, as land grabbers. However, Odinga garnered 65% of the vote in
the Rift  Valley (against  Kibaki’s  33%) and 31 out of  the 49 parliamentary seats  went
Orange.  In  return,  on  the  Laikipia  plateau,  the  pioneer  front  of  Kikuyu  settlers,9 in
Naivasha, Oloitoktok and Kajiado districts, in eastern central Rift Valley, the fear of losing
recently acquired land and the identity reflex favored the Kibaki vote and the election of
pro-government candidates.
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16 Finally, in Coast Province, the debate around majimbo (which should be understood not
as “federalism” but as “regional preference”)—explicitly advocated for by Odinga and
equally criticized by Kibaki—was at the core of the campaigns and the voting.10 In this
region,  the MoU signed between Odinga and the Muslims during the campaigns also
contributed to rallying some voters in support of ODM.11 But the majimbo issue played
out differently elsewhere,  especially in the Rift  Valley and in North-Eastern Province
where it was seen as a means of evicting non-native minorities, particularly the Kikuyu.
17 In a number of areas, the generational dimension of the election was finally expressed
clearly. Thus, in Kisii land, where the same number of MPs was elected on both sides,
scenes of violence during riots at the beginning of January involved pro-ODM youths
hunting down and threatening their elders whom they blamed for supporting Kibaki,
considered a dishonest elder.
18 On the whole, support for Odinga and for his pro-majimbo political plan—the only real
stumbling block between the two parties—the rejection of Kibaki and his government (“
We will punish him”) and the identity proximity (“He is from among us”) were the main
driving forces in the electoral choice.
 
History and geography of post-election violence
19 The results of the elections were still unknown towards the end of December 2007 when
the  delay  in  tallying  and  growing  rumours  of  rigging  triggered  off  an  escalation  of
violence. These events were relayed by the media to the Western world as the New Year
was ushered in.12 Two months later, these events resulted in 1,000 deaths and 300,000
IDPs, according to official figures. The mapping of the violence largely arise from the
same logic as the violence, which can be identified by isolating the various phases from
which  the  violence  developed  from  the  end  of  December 2007  and  the  end  of
February 2008.
20 First, between the end of December and mid-January, postelection frustration was vented
in riots that inflamed constituencies that the opposition had won: Luoland, especially its
capital Kisumu, Mombasa and parts of Nairobi inhabited by the Luo, starting with the
sprawling Kibera slums, and to a lesser extent Kawangware slums, and some pockets in
Mathare slums in the east of the capital. Between Nakuru and Eldoret, especially around
Turbo and Timboroa, and the rural areas within the Eldoret-Nakuru-Kericho triangle, the
violence  took  the  form  of  peasant  uprising,  which  was  undoubtedly  course  stage-
managed by local politicians and prominent figures.13 The violence first targeted Kikuyu
minorities  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  Kisii  minorities.  However,  while  in  Kisumu
spontaneous riots led to the destruction of entire streets without a single loss of life (the
violent  deaths  were  caused  by  a  disproportionate  reaction  of  the  security forces  in
clashes  that  lacked  the  ethnic  dimension),  pogroms  and  uprisings  elsewhere  were
accompanied  by  violent  deaths.  A  case  in  point  is  the  arson  attack  on  a  church  in
Kiambaa, an area in Eldoret, where about 30 people met their death.14
21 Nevertheless, contrary to what the international media led the world to believe, not the
whole country was in a state of unrest. Riots, looting and murders mainly took place in
areas  with  high  population density:  western  Kenya,  mainly  in  Luoland,  settlement
schemes in former White settler highlands of the Rift Valley,15 some parts of the intra-
urban  slums  (and  not  the populous  slums  in  the  outskirts)  and  their  immediate
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neighbourhoods in Mombasa and especially Nairobi. An assessment of this as a reversal of
the security map—usually it is the regions in north-eastern and northern Kenya that are
reputed for insecurity—would be attractive if the localized nature of the violence was not
so clear. Thus, in Kibera for example (700,000 residents on 10 km2), where the violence
received most media coverage, the Soweto 5 and Lindi sections were not affected by any
violence. Similarly, although there clashes pitting gangs from poor sections like Kisumu
Ndogo, Katwekera and Kianda against militias from estates like Olympic, Ayany and Fort
Jesus, the neighbouring Karanja estate, which is inhabited by the small well-organized
minority Nubians (descendants of Sudanese soldiers who served in the colonial army) was
spared from chaos; the rest of the sprawling slum also remained calm. These events of the
second half of January 2008 shows the slide of political violence into social violence with
criminal actors, gangs that were prompt in taking advantage of the slightest lapse in
vigilance of the police to operate in broad daylight. This descent in some cases began as
early as the beginning of January.
22 In the third phase,  from the end of January 2008,  urban riots in Kisumu and Nairobi
gradually died down and the violence was transferred to other areas where different
ethnic  communities  cohabited;  Nakuru  town  (25 January)  and  its  suburbs,  then  the
Naivasha horticultural belt (27 January) and finally the north-western suburb of Nairobi
(29 January)  and the large coffee plantations in Central  Province.  In these areas,  the
violence was in the form of targeted revenge against minorities from western parts of the
country, which was instigated by some Kikuyu politicians, with the support of militias
like Mungiki16 among others. The horticultural farms in Naivasha, the Kenya Agricultural
Research  Institute  laboratories  in  the  outskirts  of  Nairobi  and  the  Kenya  Forestry
Research  Institute  in  Muguga,  were  targeted  for  ethnic  cleansing.17 This  organized
violence coincided with the assassination of two opposition MPs—Embakasi and Eldoret
South. The latter was killed by a policeman claiming to be the husband of his concubine!18
These also coincided with personal threats against some of the most visible human rights
activists. All these happened while talks to resolve the crisis between the government and
the opposition continued in the Kenyan capital under the chairmanship of Kofi Annan.
23 During the entire period, clashes between peasant communities persisted and spread to
the Nakuru—Eldoret—Kericho triangle, albeit in a more localized manner. These were
mainly  triggered  by  Kalenjins  (mainly  Nandis  and  Kipsigis)  often  degenerating  into
border battles, resulting in clashes over administrative borders between cosmopolitan
districts. This was very clear between Kisii and Kalenjin land.
24 Therefore, the violence did not have the same modalities everywhere or at the same time.
Behind  the  settling  of  scores,  intimidation  and  police  overzealousness,  which  were
seemingly intentional (a good number of dead bodies had bullet wounds on the back19),
there was a mixture of political exasperation and xenophobia mainly targeting minority
groups considered “outsiders.”20
25 In urban centres, violence affected small traders, especially the Kikuyu, while in the rural
areas, its target was small “outsider” land owners. First, the violence was accompanied by
looting and secondly, it involved destroying homes of “outsiders,” who in some cases had
been  residents  since  the  1960s.  This  was  aimed  at  reducing  their  title  deeds  and
discouraging them from ever returning. The relationship between the victims and their
aggressors were different depending on whether the violence occurred in urban centres
or rural areas, but in the rural areas, what was often shocking was that the attackers
knew the  people  they  had  targeted.  In  many  cases,  these  were  their  neighbours  of
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longstanding. It was difficult to avoid drawing similarities with the violent episodes that
rocked countries in the Congo-Nile crest, Rwanda and Burundi. In campaigns carried out
in western parts of the Rift Valley, “Kalenjin” warriors, who swung into action with some
degree of preparation and consultation, triggered the violence. These militias sometimes
occupied towns—Eldoret for example—police stations, schools and churches, where their
targets took refuge.
26 Initially, in the urban centres, the violence was often spontaneous, with the hallmarks of
political riots. These brought together groups of young men. Secondly, the violence often
involved sects or gangs,  which sometimes carried out serious,  highly localized ethnic
cleansing, especially in Mathare. For a change, in a departure from what happened in
1982 and 1990, the central district of Nairobi did not experience any destruction. Despite
employers’ fears and traffic jams (linked more to lack of means of transport and police
roadblocks than to the violence itself), life went on normally for the whole of the crisis
period. Thus, many decades of urban segregation, police tactics and election strategies
confined the violence to the poor districts.
 
Territorial consequences of the post-election violence
27 The immediate effect of the violence was the suspension of economic activity which had
already slowed down during the vacation period at the end of the year.21 The violence
compartmentalized space, reduced mobility, left the streets and especially the markets
empty. The streets were abandoned for security forces while markets were at the mercy
of looters and traders’ militias. The constrained mobility was one of the consequences of
the crisis.  On the roads,  there was an increase in the number of  barriers erected by
vigilantes or by the police, which were turned into toll stations and roadblocks,22 points
for predatory activities and targeted violence. These barriers divided the country into
two mobility spaces: on the one hand, the east, where there was normal movement, and
on  the  other  hand,  the  west,  towards  which  all  movement  was  virtually  banned,
especially for transporters identified as Kikuyu. This led Ugandan entrepreneurs, whose
access to the sea had been cut off,  to insist that the Kenyan government secures the
Mombasa—Nairobi—Nakuru—Malaba—Busia  corridor.  These  road  barriers  mobilized
young rebels, who seemed to be insensitive to calls for calm by their elders and local
political leaders.
28 On 15 January 2008, 250,000 people were classified as internally displaced and received at
police posts, schools, show grounds and stadia while 6,000 others, three quarters of which
were Kikuyus, fled to Uganda for refuge. At the beginning of February, following the
revenge  attacks  around  Naivasha,  the  Kenya  Red  Cross  Society  placed  the  figure  of
internally displaced people at 300,000. They had been offered shelter at police stations,
prisons,  some  schools  and  missions,  and  in  make-shift  camps.  Out  of  these  300,000
internally displaced people, 21,000 were based at the Eldoret camp set up at the show
ground, 37,000 were based at the four camps in Kitale, 42,000 were based in the Molo
camp, 52,000 in Nakuru and 16,000 in Naivasha. By the end of February, the Red Cross
estimations were 270,000 internally displaced in camps and 230,000 received by other
families.23
29 The geography of displacements can be generally identified. The majority of internally
displaced  people  came from settlement  schemes  on  the  western  borders  of  the  Rift
Valley,  Uasin  Gishu  and  Nandi  districts,  areas  where  agricultural  employees  live  in
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Naivasha, Nakuru and Thika. The displaced people were small scale farmers, generally
Kikuyu  and  Kamba,  sometimes  Kisii,  who  had  settled  for  one  or  two  generations,
agricultural  employees and junior Luo or Luhya civil  servants settled in the dynamic
areas in Central Province and eastern Rift Valley. All of them wanted to go back to their
“villages of origin” or “ancestral land”—those from western Kenya even swore never to
come back while holders of title deeds, mainly Kikuyu, very intent on coming back, to the
land they now considered theirs. This situation led to a form of “Kikuyunisation” of the
junior  staff  in the horticulture farms around Naivasha and in Central  Province.  Luo,
Luhya and Kalenjin migrants in the farms were replaced by Kikuyu driven out of Maasai
land, especially from Narok District to the south.
30 In Nairobi, during the weeks that followed the riots, tenants in populous residential areas
(Kibera,  Eastleigh, Mathare, Kangemi, Kawangware) were evicted by their landlords if
they did not share the same ethnic identity. In the urban areas, social interaction led to
ethnic and regional  agreement between the tenants and the landlords at  houses and
residential estates. In the slums where the population is mixed, like in some parts of
Mathare, gangs polarized space, leading to clear community fragmentation, with areas
for Kikuyu or those from Central Province and neighbouring Kamba land and areas for
the Luo or those from western Kenya.
31 Finally,  a  certain  number  of  internally  displaced  people  found  refuge  not  in  their
“ancestral” land—which they sometimes only knew by name and where they were not
always welcome—but in the Nairobi slums, which had to suffer under further congestion.
There  was  therefore  aggravation  of  urban poverty  during  the  two  months  of  crisis.
Humanitarian actors unanimously agreed that this  trend could persist  and affect  the
urban landscape in the long-term.24
32 This  spatial  evolution  towards  increased  space  fragmentation  at  all  levels  is  a
demonstration of a brutal re-ethnicisation of social and territorial relations. The public
space, ideally perceived as relatively neutral, has brutally receded, become fragmented
and territorialized, in some cases to the extreme. The election and its mismanagement
through  rigging  was  sometimes  simply  the  trigger  for  violence  whose  common
denominator remains the classification and demonization of the other as the foreigner.25
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Map 1: Leading candidates in the 2007 presidential elections
 
Map 2: Results of the legislative elections of 27 December 2007
Conceived by Bernard Calas, IFRA; Produced by Marie-Louise Penin, ADES CNRS, 2008.
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Map 3: Rate of participation in the 2007 elections
Conceived by Bernard Calas, IFRA; Produced by Marie-Louise Penin, ADES CNRS, 2008.
 
Map 4: constituencies with disputed results in the presidential elections, 30 December 2007
Conceived by Bernard Calas, IFRA; Produced by Marie-Louise Penin, ADES CNRS, 2008.
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Map 5: Kenya—an inverted land? A sketch of the violence experienced from 27 December 2007 to
28 February 2008<
 
Map 6: An indication of electoral hegemony
The rate by which the number of the votes obtained by the second candidate should be used to get
the number of votes of the leading candidate.
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NOTES
1. This paper was written using information gathered from interviews and observations
in Kenya, as events of the end of year 2007–2008 unfolded.
2. A. Oloo, ‘Contested terrain: the politics of citizenship and constitutionalism in Kenya’
and  L.  Maina,  F.  Waswa  and  S.  Waiyego,  ‘Pitfalls  in  constitution-making  in  Kenya:
experiences from Bomas and the 2005 national referendum.’ In H. Charton and C. Médard
(eds.), Annuaire de l’Afrique orientale 2005, Paris, l’Harmattan, 2007, pp. 59–101 and 103–127
respectively.
3. The voter registration exercise merits a whole paper on its own. Between 2002 and
2007, 4 million new voters were registered, which well over the natural increase in the
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